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Abstract
Many naturally occurring networks have a power-law degree dis-
tribution as well as a non-zero degree correlation. Despite this, most
studies analyzing the robustness to random node-deletion and vulner-
ability to targeted node-deletion have concentrated only on power-law
degree distribution and ignored degree correlation. This study looks
specifically at the effect degree-correlation has on robustness and vul-
nerability in scale-free networks. Our results confirm Newman’s find-
ing that positive degree-correlation increases robustness and decreases
vulnerability. However, we found that networks with positive degree-
correlation are more vulnerable to random node-deletion than to tar-
geted deletion methods that utilize knowledge of initial node-degree
only. Targeted deletion sufficiently alters the topology of the network
to render this method less effective than uniform random methods un-
less changes in topology are accounted for. This result indicates the
importance of degree correlation in certain network applications.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Barabasi and Albert [1] showing how networks
built through growth and the preferential attachment of nodes naturally
have a power-law degree distribution, work in network science has focused
on networks following a power-law distribution instead of a binomial distri-
bution. Most real-world networks have been found to follow a power-law
distribution [10]. In this study, we test the robustness to random node-
deletion and vulnerability to targeted node-deletion in randomly-generated
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networks that not only follow a power-law degree distribution, but also have
varying levels of degree-correlation. Even though many naturally occurring
networks have non-zero degree correlation, few of the previous studies look-
ing at robustness and vulnerability of networks have included this important
aspect of realism [3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14] (however, see [9]). For example, in
[2, 5], the authors study the effect of node-deletion, both random and tar-
geted, on the sizes of the connected components of power-law networks; they
do not consider the effect of degree correlation.
Random node-deletion models random failure in, say, a power grid. Tar-
geted node-deletion models sabotage in a power grid or computer network.
Naturally, one expects that targeted deletion would be more effective than
random deletion at breaking a network into small connected components,
and this is usually true. However, in the presence of sufficiently high positive
degree-correlation, if the targeted deletion is based on limited information
— only the degrees of nodes in the initial network — targeted deletion
performs worse than random deletion at breaking the network into small
connected components. We demonstrate this by deleting nodes from vari-
ous 1000-node networks until all connected components have size at most
20, thus destroying the giant component.
2 Methods
One hundred different 1000-node networks were constructed via preferential
attachment. For each such network, a rewiring algorithm was applied to
copies of the network to produce degree-correlation coefficients of -0.3, -0.2,
-0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 (see Section 2.2). Three further copies of each
rewired network were then created and subjected to three different node-
deletion methods, whereby we deleted nodes until the largest connected
component had at most 20 nodes:
Method 1 (Random) Choose nodes to delete uniformly at random, until no con-
nected component of the network has size exceeding 20
Method 2 (Initial Degree Rank) Delete nodes in decreasing order of node-degrees
in the original network, until no connected component of the network
has size exceeding 20
Method 3 (Updated Degree Rank – Omniscient) Delete nodes in decreasing order
of node-degree, recalculating the degree of every node every 10 dele-
tions, until no connected component of the network has size exceeding
20
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One may think of these three methods as “no knowledge”, “knowledge
of initial degree rank”, and “complete knowledge of the network structure”,
respectively. The results of the analysis are displayed in Figure 1.
In order to estimate the variability in our samples, we performed boot-
strap resampling by taking 1,000,000 samples of size 100 (with replacement)
from our original data sets for Methods 1 and 2, r = 0.3.
2.1 Network generation
We used the Python library networkx to generate our networks. Specifically,
we used the function barabasi albert graph(n, m) with 1000 nodes (n =
1000) and with each added node attaching to three existing nodes (m = 3).
2.2 A rewiring algorithm
We consider the algorithm proposed in [13] to give an existing network posi-
tive or negative degree correlation without changing the degree distribution.
1. Choose two edges e1, e2 uniformly at random, rejecting pairs of edges
incident to a common node. Suppose the nodes are n1, n2, n3, n4 with
deg(n1) ≤ deg(n2) ≤ deg(n3) ≤ deg(n4).
2. (a) (positive correlation) Check to see that n1 is not adjacent to n2,
and that n3 is not adjacent to n4; if so, delete e1, e2 and add n1n2
and n3n4 to the network; else proceed.
(b) (negative correlation) Check to see that n1 is not adjacent to n4,
and that n2 is not adjacent to n3; if so, delete e1, e2 and add n1n4
and n2n3 to the network; else proceed.
3. Repeat a prescribed number of times.
3 Results
The percent deleted necessary to reduce the size of the largest connected
component to 20 or fewer for each level of manipulated degree-correlation
for each of the node-deletion methods is plotted in Figure 1 (a). Histograms
for the averages of each bootstrap resampling from our original data sets for
Methods 1 and 2, r = 0.3 are in Figure 1 (b). The corresponding resampling
intervals are non-overlapping at the 94.5% confidence level.
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Figure 1: (a) Data and averages for different correlation levels. (b) Resam-
pling histogram for Method 1 (in red) and Method 2 (in blue) for r = 0.3
with 106 resamples
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4 Discussion
As expected, positive degree correlation raises the number of nodes which
must be deleted in order to reduce the size of the largest connected compo-
nent to 20 or fewer nodes [11, 9]. Not surprisingly, under certain conditions,
using knowledge of the initial degree rank (method 2) to inform the node-
deletion method results in fewer nodes needing to be deleted than in a ran-
dom node-deletion method (method 1), as previously found [2, 5]. However,
under sufficiently high positive degree-correlation, deleting nodes based on
initial degree rank (method 2) actually requires more node-deletion than
the random method (method 1). In networks with sufficiently high posi-
tive degree correlation, in order for knowledge of initial degree rank to be
effectively utilized, the degree rank must be continually updated as nodes
are removed from the network (method 3). Hu and Tang [9] showed previ-
ously that updating the degree rank does result in fewer nodes needing to be
deleted than method 2, and the difference is greater in networks with posi-
tive degree correlation than those with negative degree correlation; however,
due to the narrow scope of their chosen correlation coefficients (0.0579 and
-0.0441), they did not discover the extent to which this performance differ-
ence is manifest. Additionally, they did not compare the performance of the
initial degree rank method to a random method, thus missing the important
observation that method 2 can actually perform worse than method 1 in
networks with sufficiently high positive correlation. It is worth noting that
studies analyzing the effectiveness of various node-deletion methods most
often use the default preferential attachment model, which has a degree-
correlation of zero; according to our results, this happens to be the condition
under which there is the largest difference in performance between method
1 and method 2. See Figure 1 (a).
Besides applications to power grids and computer networks, a possible
implication of this result is for immunization protocols. Imagine a disease
with, for simplicity, perfect transmission efficiency such that any individ-
ual within a population that shares a transmission vector with an infected
individual will always become infected. Therefore, in the network model, in-
dividuals are represented as nodes with the edges representing direct trans-
mission vectors; thus all nodes with a connected path to an infected node
also become infected. If the network is connected, that means that if one
node is infected, then the entire network will be infected. Immunization
can then be modeled by deletion of nodes from the network. When enough
individuals are immunized—that is, when enough nodes are deleted—the
network becomes disconnected and part of the network will become isolated
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from the infection, effectively stopping the spread of the disease. As im-
munization progresses through time, the network is decomposed into more
and more, smaller and smaller connected components. Each of these con-
nected components, if harboring an infected individual, will become entirely
infected, but the disease will not spread to the other components. Thus, the
size of the largest connected component represents the worst-case scenario
for the outbreak of the disease. (Setting the cutoff for an acceptable number
of people to be infected is arbitrary and does not qualitatively affect our re-
sults.) Therefore, this suggests that in human interaction networks, which
often have a power-law degree distribution and positive degree correlation,
having some knowledge of the network structure beyond initial degree rank
could be critical for choosing the most effective immunization protocol.
5 Conclusion
We found that networks with positive degree-correlation are more vulnera-
ble to random node-deletion than to targeted deletion methods that utilize
knowledge of initial node-degree only. Targeted deletion sufficiently alters
the topology of the network to render this method less effective than uni-
form random methods unless changes in topology are accounted for. This
result indicates the importance of degree correlation in certain network ap-
plications.
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